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in the principal case admits that questions as to liability under
the statute are to be determined by federal law. Instead of taking
this course, the court, citing Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Monroe v. Pape, supra, decided that the general background of tort
liability should be the source of the law applied. When that law
is found in state decisions, the footnoted rule is in effect reversed
as state law becomes controlling.
The decision that judicial immunity and volenti non fit injuria apply to the federal acts will probably not have severe consequences. It is difficult to imagine a person consenting to a
deprivation of his civil rights other than in a factual situation
similar to the one in the principal case. However, the method
the court used in arriving at the decision concerning the defense of
consent does establish a questionable precedent. In applying a
federal statute specifically enacted to override state law, it seems
very strange that the court should look to state law.
ForrestHansburyRoles

Constitutional Law-Apportionment of Constitutional Conventions
The Governor of West Virginia sought a writ of mandamus in
the state's Supreme Court of Appeals to require the Commissioner
of Finance and Administration to affix his signature to certain
contracts for publishing notices of a special public election on the
question of calling a convention to alter the state's constitution.
Held, writ denied. The statute setting up the method by which
delegates to the convention would be chosen and under which
the expenditure of funds would be made was unconstitutional in
that it violated the state's constitutional provision regulating apportionments of representation. State ex rel. Smith v. Gore, 143
S.E.2d 791 (W. Va. 1965).
The principal case was decided on the basis of the applicability
of article II, section 4, of the West Virginia Constitution to the
apportionment of a constitutional convention. The constitution provides: "Every citizen shall be entitled to equal representation in
government, and, in all apportionments of representation, equality
of numbers of those entitled thereto, shall, as far as practicable,
be preserved." It was not necessary for the court to consider the
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possible application of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment or the "one man one vote" concept developed consequent to Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962), and subsequent
federal reapportionment cases relying on the fourteenth amendment. For a discussion of the Baker case see Note, 65 W. VA. L.
REv. 129 (1963).
Similarly in Robertson v. Hatcher, 148 W. Va. 239, 135 S.E.2d
675 (1964), the court, in declaring the apportionment of the house
of delegates unconstitutional, found it unnecessary to consider
federal constitutional problems as the act in question clearly violated the express wording of article VI, sections 6, 7, of the West
Virginia Constitution. These provisions govern specifically the
allocation of delegates to counties having less than a particular
ratio of population.
Notwithstanding the number of cases involving the reapportionment of state legislatures and other bodies that have arisen since
Baker v. Carr, supra, the question of apportionment of a constitutional convention, which in many instances is the vehicle by
which a reapportionment of other bodies is effected, apparently
has been the central issue in only one instance other than the
principal case. In West v. Carr, 212 Tenn. 367, 370 S.W.2d 469
(1963), cert. denied, 378 U.S. 557 (1964), the Tennessee court upheld the apportionment of a constitutional convention based on
the same system as the apportionment of the state's house of representatives, which had been declared invalid as a result of Baker
v. Car', supra. The court concluded that a fundamental difference
existed between a legislative body and a constitutional convention
which made the reasoning of the Baker case inapplicable-the
convention could not take final action but was limited to proposing constitutional changes for ratification or rejection by the
people.
In reaching its decision the Tennessee court relied upon the
concept that a constitutional convention is not a co-ordinate branch
of government in the usually accepted sense. This view stems from
the early cases of State v. Doyle, 138 La. 750, 70 So. 322 (1915),
and Wells v. Bain, 75 Pa. 39 (1874), which stand for the proposition that a constitutional convention is simply a body raised by
law to discuss and to propose amendments or changes in the existing constitution which are without force so long as they remain
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proposals. Although this reasoning is not without merit, the court
in the principal case was more realistic in appraising the purpose
of a convention. The West Virginia court pointed out that the
function of a convention encompasses much more than making a
mere proposal to the people because it formulates and determines
what the constitution will contain. The court concluded that the
mere right to approve or to disapprove a proposed constitution
does not afford to the public the voice in its formation required by
article II, section 4, of the West Virginia Constitution. Analogous
reasoning was used by the Supreme Court in Lucas v. Colorado
General Assembly, 377 U. S. 713 (1964). The Court held that
even though an apportionment plan for the Colorado Senate had
been ratified by a substantial portion of the state's voters by referendum, the plan was unconstitutional because it failed to meet
the required standards of apportionment. In other words, constitutional rights may not be taken from the minority by majority
vote, and the mere possibility that the majority may reject something proposed by the representatives of the minority does not
give to each citizen the required protection of his constitutional
rights.
Though the reasoning used in the principal case may be analogous to that used by federal courts in reapportionment cases, the
fact remains that no federal constitutional question was decided.
In like manner the West case, supra, was decided ostensibly on
the ground that the manner of convention apportionment violated
no part of the Tennessee Constitution, and the court apparently
felt that the fourteenth amendment was inapplicable to a constitutional convention. Whether or not the equal protection
clause is applicable to a state constitutional convention would
appear to be an open question.
The equal protection clause has been applied to the apportionment of the upper house of a state legislature, Lucas v. Colorado,
General Assembly, supra, and in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368
(1963), it was relied on in holding the Georgia county unit system
of electing a governor invalid. In Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1
(1964), the apportionment of Georgia's congressional districts was
in issue and again the "one man one vote" concept was applied.
The issue involved in Reed v. Mann, 237 F. Supp. 22 (N. D. Ga.
1964), was the manner in which county commissioners were elected in various Georgia counties; the court held that the "one man
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one vote" rule was applicable to the residents of a particular unit
of local government.
Although the Supreme Court has not held that the equal protection clause applies to the apportionment of a constitutional convention, the issue has been discussed in Fortson v. Toombs, 379
U.S. 621 (1965), and has been indirectly involved in other cases.
In Fortson the district court had enjoined state election officials
from placing on the ballot a constitutional amendment designed to
amend the existing constitution by substituting an entirely new
constitution. The district court's order stated that it was not to be
construed to forbid the calling of a convention to amend or
change the constitution if the convention were based as nearly
as practicable on population. The majority opinion of the Supreme
Court vacated part of the district court's order because it was moot.
However, Justice Harlan in a separate opinion stated that there
is nothing in the fourteenth amendment or elsewhere in the Constitution or in the Court's decisions which requires a state to make
constitutional change by some method in which every citizen in
the population is given an opportunity to be heard. As the issue
was not actually presented or passed upon, the statement amounts
to no more than a dictum.
In Pinney v. Butterworth, 378 U.S. 564 (1964), concerning
the apportionment of the Connecticut Legislature, the Supreme
Court remanded the case to the district court with directions to
enter an order in conformity with the principles set forth in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). In the Reynolds case the Court
had set up guide lines for future reapportionments. The district
court, in modifying its prior order setting up the schedule to be
followed in apportionment, directed that the membership of the
constitutional convention, which would deal with the legislative
reapportionment, conform with the standards required by the
fourteenth amendment.
In at least one instance a state court has intimated that the
equal protection clause applies to a state constitutional convention.
In Jackman v. Bodine, 43 N.J. 453, 205 A.2d 713 (1964), the court
held the New Jersey Legislature was malapportioned and entered
judgment allowing the legislature to call a constitutional convention, providing that, ". . . the delegates to which Convention shall
be apportioned according to population." However, the court fail-
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ed to specify whether apportionment according to population had
to comply with the requirements of the equal protection clause.
Should it become necessary for the Supreme Court to pass upon the question, the outcome probably will rest in large measure
on the method the state provides for the selection of delegates.
If the delegates are elected at large or appointed in a proper
manner by a properly constituted legislature, it is unlikely that a
denial of equal protection will be found. On the other band, considering the sweeping language used in many of the federal apportionment cases together with the broad interpretation of the
function of a constitutional convention as set forth in the principal
case, if the method selected fails to meet the standards employed
in apportioning a legislature, the guarantees of equal protection
may be held to be violated.
As previously indicated, the decision in the principal case was
based upon the provision in the West Virginia Constitution guaranteeing equal representation in all apportionments of government.
This provision would appear to be unique because research has
not disclosed a comparable provision in another state constitution.
See INDEX DIGEST TO STATE CONSTITUTIONS (2d ed. 1959). This is
understandable when one considers the underlying reasons for
West Virginia's existence. One of the paramount grievances of
western Virginians toward the east was the denial of what they
considered equal representation, both in the state legislature and
in conventions. See Hagans, ERECrION AND FORMATION OF THE
STATE OF WEST VnIcIA (1891) (reprinted in full in 1 W. Va. 5).
To prevent a possible repetition of this grevious situation the
authors of the West Virginia Constitution specifically provided for
equal representation in all apportionments of representation.
Not only is the language of the "equal representation" clause of
the West Virginia Constitution comparable with the language of
"equal protection" in the fourteenth amendment to the federal
constitution, but both provisions are products of the same period
of American history-they were adopted shortly after the War
Between the States. Thus, the principal case may well provide instructive precedent in future controversies pertaining to the apportionment of constitutional conventions.
David Gail Hanlon
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